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Abstract
This paper develops a DSGE model to examine the quantitative macroeconomic implications of
counter-cyclical fiscal policy for France, Germany and the UK. The model incorporates real wage
rigidity and consumption habits, as the particular market failures justifying policy intervention. We
subject the model to productivity shocks and allow policy instruments to react to the output gap and the
debt-to-output ratio. A welfare analysis reveals that the most effective instrument-target combination is
to use public consumption to stabilize the output gap. Moreover, welfare gains from counter-cyclical
fiscal policy are much stronger in the presence of wage rigidities compared with consumption habits.
Finally, since active policy and automatic stabilizers are substitutes, it is possible that relatively
undistorted economies may be in need of countercyclical fiscal action due to inadequate automatic
stabilizers.
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Abstract
This paper develops a DSGE model to examine the quantita-
tive macroeconomic implications of counter-cyclical scal policy for
France, Germany and the UK. The model incorporates real wage rigid-
ity and consumption habits, as the particular market failures justifying
policy intervention. We subject the model to productivity shocks and
allow policy instruments to react to the output gap and the debt-
to-output ratio. A welfare analysis reveals that the most e¤ective
instrument-target combination is to use public consumption to sta-
bilize the output gap. Moreover, welfare gains from counter-cyclical
scal policy are much stronger in the presence of wage rigidities com-
pared with consumption habits. Finally, since active policy and au-
tomatic stabilizers are substitutes, it is possible that relatively undis-
torted economies may be in need of countercyclical scal action due
to inadequate automatic stabilizers.
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The empirical evidence points to the adoption of increasingly countercycli-
cal polices by governments in OECD countries over the postwar period. [Galí,
2005]
1 Introduction
Despite the relative neglect of scal compared to monetary policy since the
1970s, there has been somewhat of a revival in the interests of European
policymakers and academics for countercyclical scal stabilization policy (see,
e.g. Andrés et al. (2008), Andrés and Doménech (2006), the papers in
the CESifo Economic Studies (2005) volume and the theoretical papers on
feedback scal policy, e.g. Aloi et al. (2003), Guo and Lansing (1998) and
Leeper (1991)). While most theorists seem to prefer the use of automatic
stabilizers to active policy rules1, in practice, as pointed out by e.g. Galí
(2005) above, policymakers do change their scal policies when the economic
fundamentals change.
In Europe, this is obviously related to the fact that monetary policy is
no longer an option for individual countries, but also to the recent sustained
slow growth in several European economies. At the same time, due to the
conditions of the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), there have also been recommendations in Europe to correct public
nance imbalances by adding, for instance, the public debt-to-GDP ratio,
or the budget decit-to-GDP ratio, to the set of fundamentals that scal
authorities should respond to.2
This renewed interest in countercyclical scal stabilization policy begs
a number of important questions regarding which, if any, of the potential
scal instruments available to policymakers will be able to deliver the desired
degree of macroeconomic stability. More importantly, will active relative to
passive policy be welfare improving?3
With this background in mind, we construct a dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model to examine the quantitative macroeconomic
implications, and the resulting welfare implications, of countercyclical state-
contingent scal policies for France, Germany and the U.K.. These policies
1We will use the terms active, feedback, state-contingent and state-dependent inter-
changeably.
2Also note that policymakers may even follow procyclical policy which further under-
mines the role of automatic stabilizers. Procyclical policies are typically associated with
political distortions. It is not the aim of this paper to analyze the e¤ects of these policies.
3Here we focus on scal policy rules, which are in the spirit of Taylor rules in the
context of monetary policy.
2
imply that the scal authorities adjust their policy instruments to the eco-
nomic situation, in a manner that is beyond the role played by automatic
stabilizers. In an attempt to more closely replicate the output dynamics that
appear in macroeconomic data, our model includes private and public capital
adjustment costs, habit persistence in consumption and real wage rigidity.
The latter is particularly relevant for Europe and is one of the market failures
justifying policy intervention in our setup.4
Our policy instruments include the three major items of public spending
(public consumption, investment and transfers) as shares of output and the
two main sources of tax revenues (income and consumption tax rates). The
governments allocative role in our setup is the provision of public consump-
tion services that augment households utility and public investment that
enhances public capital entering the rms production function. When mod-
elling feedback policy, we allow policy instruments to respond to the cyclical
state of the economy as measured by the output gap and the deviation of
the public debt-to-GDP ratio from a 60% long-run level (which is the refer-
ence level of the SGP). When such countercyclical reaction is switched o¤,
policymakers follow passive policy which in our setup is dened as automatic
stabilization.
We next subject the model to a temporary stochastic productivity shock
to evaluate the quantitative welfare implications of active versus passive pol-
icy. To conduct our general equilibrium welfare analysis, we rst follow the
linear-quadratic method introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
This approach requires that welfare be calculated using inputs approximated
in the area of the optimal (i.e. social planners) steady-state. However, we
also use a more general measure, in which these inputs are approximated in
the area of the non-optimal steady-state (i.e. a long-run that includes mar-
ket and policy distortions). Using these two measures, we quantify welfare
under active and passive policy and solve for a compensating consumption
supplement that can make welfare equal in the two policy regimes (see, also
e.g. Lucas (1990)).
Our main ndings are as follows. First, the dependence of tax rates on the
output and debt volatility introduces local indeterminacy (i.e. expectations-
driven outcomes), at least for a large range of parameter values (see also e.g.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) for the US).5 Second, reaction to public
4Indeed, it is widely believed that real wage rigidity is one of the most important dis-
tortions in most European economies (see, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003) and Blanchard
and Galí (2007)).
5Also, tax rates, especially income tax rates, change infrequently via reforms and po-
litical debates (see also e.g. King and Rebelo (1999, p. 974)). For these reasons, tax rates
are not state-contingent in our setup. Also, since transfers do not a¤ect the real allocation
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debt can also lead to local indeterminacy. This most likely occurs since
reaction to public debt requires ceteris paribus a stronger countercyclical
reaction than reaction to the output gap.6 Third, using public investment
for stabilization yields negligible welfare benets, probably because its output
share is very small in the data (e.g. 2.9, 3.0 and 1.1 percent for Germany,
France and the U.K. respectively). Fourth, the most e¤ective instrument-
target combination is to use public consumption spending, as a share of
output, to stabilize the output gap.7 Fifth, welfare gains from countercyclical
scal policy are much stronger in the presence of wage rigidities compared
with consumption habits. Sixth, the welfare gains from active policy are
much greater when we work in the area of the distorted versus the socially
optimum steady-state. This happens because there are more non-internalized
distortions in the former case, and this naturally increases the scope for active
policy. Finally, the largest welfare gains from active policy accrue to Germany
followed by France and the U.K.. This order follows the ranking of (market
and policy) distortions across the three countries. However, the relative
distribution of welfare gains may change when we take automatic stabilizers
into account. For instance, although the U.K. is the least distorted economy
in our setup, in some cases, it benets most from countercyclical scal action
because of inadequate automatic stabilizers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set out
the theoretical and parameterized models. Section 4 studies the models
t relative to the data. The welfare analysis is contained in Section 5 and
Section 6 concludes the paper. Details pertaining to the steady-state, the
linearized system, and welfare analysis under the two criteria, are contained
in Appendices A-D respectively.8
2 The Theoretical Model
The DSGE model we develop below is populated by a large, but constant,
number of identical innitely-lived private agents (households and rms).
The government imposes distorting taxes and issues bonds to nance public
in our setup, their share in output will remain constant.
6This explanation is consistent with the result that the possibility of indeterminacy in-
creases with the intensity of countercyclicality (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997)).
7Note that this is the policy instrument that most economists seem to prefer, at
least for scal consolidation reasons. Also note that our nding regarding the relative
(in)e¤ectiveness of public investment versus consumption maintains when absolute instead
of proportional deviations in public consumption and public investment are employed.
8Note that further details of the derivations in Appendices A-D, plus model solution
and Watsons measure are available upon request.
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consumption, investment and transfers. The governments policy instruments
can follow feedback rules which depend on both exogenous factors and the
endogenous state of the economy. We allow for the well-known persistence
of macroeconomic variables by including capital adjustment costs, habit per-
sistence in consumption and real wage rigidity.
2.1 Households
The preferences of each household, indexed by the superscript h, are given
by the intertemporal utility function:
E0
1X
t=0
tUht = E0
1X
t=0
tU
 
Cht   Ct 1; Lht ; G
c
t

(1)
where E0 is the expectations operator; Cht is private consumption of house-
hold h at time t; Ct 1 is average (per capita) lagged-once private consump-
tion; Lht is the leisure time of household h at t; G
c
t is average consumption
services provided by the government at t; 0   < 1 is a habit persistence
parameter; and 0 <  < 1 is the rate of time preference. In other words, util-
ity depends positively on consumption relative to an external habit variable,
where the latter is assumed to be proportional to average past consumption
(see, e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003, and Christiano et al., 2005), leisure time
and public consumption services.
Instantaneous utility, Uht ; is increasing in its three arguments, concave
and satises the Inada conditions. We employ the widely-used form:
Uht =
[(Cht   Ct 1)1(Lht )2(G
c
t)
1 1 2 ]1 
1   (2)
where, 0 < 1; 2; (1   1   2) < 1 are the weights given to relative
consumption, leisure time and public consumption services respectively, and
 > 1 is the degree of risk aversion.
Each household can save in the form of capital, Iht , and government bonds,
Dht . It receives interest income, r
k
tK
h
t , from accumulated capital and r
b
tB
h
t
from accumulated bonds, where rkt and r
b
t denote the gross returns to capital
and bonds respectively. The household divides its time endowment between
leisure and work so that Lht +H
h
t = 1 at each t. Labor augmenting techno-
logical progress at time t is Zt = zt, where z  1 is a constant growth rate.
Given Zt, each household receives labor income, wtZtHht , per unit of e¤ective
time worked. Finally, the household receives dividends paid by rms, ht , and
average lump-sum transfers paid by the government, G
tr
t . Accordingly, the
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budget constraint of each household is:
(1 +  ct)C
h
t + I
h
t +D
h
t = (1   yt )(rktKht + wtZtHht +ht + rbtBht ) +G
tr
t (3)
where 0 <  yt < 1 and 0 < 
c
t < 1 are respectively the tax rates on income
and private consumption at t. Private holdings of government bonds and
capital grow according to the following evolution equations:
Bht+1 = B
h
t +D
h
t (4)
and
Kht+1 = (1  p)Kht + Iht  
p
2

Iht
Kht
  I
h
Kh
2
Kht (5)
where 0  p  1 is a constant depreciation rate, p  0 captures internal
adjustment costs on gross private investment, and Ih=Kh denotes the ratio
of households investment to capital in the long run (where this ratio will be
stationary in equilibrium; see sub-section 2.5 below). Note that, in common
with the RBC literature, adjustment costs will be zero in the long run.
Households act competitively by taking market prices, policy variables
and economy-wide variables as given. Thus, each household h chooses fCht ;
Hht ; L
h
t ; I
h
t ; D
h
t ; K
h
t+1; B
h
t+1g1t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (2)   (5); the
restriction Lht +H
h
t = 1 and initial conditions forK
h
0 and B
h
0 .
9 The rst-order
conditions include the constraints (3) (5); the optimality condition for labor
supply, (6a), and the Euler-equations for private capital and government
bonds (6b  6c) :
wt =
   @Uht =@Hht  (1 +  ct) 
@Uht =@C
h
t

(1   yt )zt
MRSt (6a)
@Uht =@C
h
t
1 +  ct
= Et

Zkt+1

@Uht+1=@C
h
t+1
1 +  ct+1

(6b)
@Uht =@C
h
t
1 +  ct
= Et

Zbt+1

@Uht+1=@C
h
t+1
1 +  ct+1

(6c)
where we dene: eIht  IhtKht   I
h
Kh
;
9We assume that each household takes average lagged-once consumption, Ct 1; as
given. Thus, this is an "external habit" model (see the discussion in e.g. Campbell (1999,
p. 1284) for di¤erent models of habit formation). Also see Appendix C, for the social
planners solution that internalizes all variables.
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Zkt+1 

1  peIht 
8><>: 1   yt+1 rkt+1 +
1  p + peIht+1  Iht+1Kht+1  p2 eIht+12
1  peIht+1
9>=>;
Zbt+1  1 +
 
1   yt+1

rbt+1.
2.2 Firms
Each rm, indexed by the superscript f , produces an homogeneous nal
product, Y ft , by using private capital, K
f
t , private labor, H
f
t , and average
(per rm) public capital, K
g
t .
10 The production function of each rm takes
the form:
Y ft = At(K
f
t )
1(ZtH
f
t )
2
 
K
g
t
1 1 2 (7a)
where At is exogenous stochastic productivity (whose motion is specied
below) and 0 < 1; 2; (1   1   2) < 1 are the productivity of private
capital, labor and public capital respectively. We follow e.g. Lansing (1998)
by assuming CRS in the three factors.
Firms act competitively by taking market prices, policy variables and
economy-wide variables as given. Thus, each rm f chooses Kft and H
f
t to
maximize
ft  (1   st)Y ft   rktKft   wtZtHft (7b)
where  1 <  st < 0 denotes an output subsidy and vice-versa for 0 <  st <
1.11 The returns to capital and labor are given by:
rkt =
1 (1   st)Y ft
Kft
(7c)
wt =
2 (1   st)Y ft
ZtH
f
t
. (7d)
2.3 Wage setting
To avoid further complicating the model but to also help it replicate the
stylized facts in Europe regarding inertia in wage adjustment, we follow the
setup employed in Blanchard and Galí (2007). In particular, we assume that:
wt  (wt 1) (MRSt)1  (8)
10The constant number of rms equals the constant number of households.
11This tax/subsidy will only be used to conduct our Rotemberg-Woodford type of welfare
analysis (see subsection 5.2 below). In all other parts, this is set to be zero. Having this
in mind, it will su¢ ce to use a at rate over time, i.e.  st   s0 at all t.
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where 0    0measures the degree of wage sluggishness andMRSt is given
by (6a) above. The basic idea behind this partial adjustment model is that
real wages respond only sluggishly to current conditions in the labor market.
As pointed out by Blanchard and Galí (2007), "this is a parsimonious way of
modeling the slow adjustment of wages to labor market conditions, as found
in a variety of models of real wage rigidities, without taking a stand on what
is the rightmodel". In other words, although ad hoc, this specication can
be consistent with a number of possible sources of rigidity in European labor
markets, e.g. institutional, legal and sociopolitical rigidities and safety nets,
etc. Blanchard and Katz (1997) review the literature and provide empirical
evidence that wages depend strongly on lagged wages. Finally, notice that
this modeling has the following implications: (i) if  = 0; the standard
neoclassical model obtains; (ii) in the steady-state, i.e. when wt = wt 1 = w,
it follows that again w =MRS:
2.4 Government
In per capita terms, the within-period government budget constraint is (as
above, variables with an upper bar denote per capita quantities):
G
c
t +G
i
t +G
tr
t +
 
1 + rbt

Bt =
= Bt+1 + 
y
t
 
rktKt + wtZtH t +t + r
b
tBt

(9a)
+ stY t + 
c
tCt
where G
c
t , G
i
t, and G
tr
t are respectively per capita government consumption,
government investment and government transfers at t, and Bt+1 is the end-
of-period per capita stock of bonds issued by the government.12
Government investment, G
i
t, is used to augment the stock of public capital
whose motion is given by (in per capita terms):
K
g
t+1 = (1  g)K
g
t +G
i
t  
g
2
 
G
i
t
K
g
t
  G
i
K
g
!2
K
g
t (9b)
where 0  g  1 is a constant depreciation rate, g  0 captures adjustment
costs on gross public investment, and G
i
=K
g
denotes the ratio of per capita
public investment to public capital in the long run (where this ratio will be
stationary in equilibrium; see sub-section 2.5 below).
12Since lump-sum transfers/taxes do not a¤ect real allocations, they will be set to zero.
Only in the long run, when the public debt-to-output ratio is set at a given value (e.g. the
reference value of 60% as implied by the SGP), lump-sum transfers/taxes will be non-zero
playing the role of the residual variable that satises the government budget constraint.
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2.5 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given the paths of technology and labor augmenting technical progress fAt;
Ztg1t=0, economic policy instruments fGct ; Git; Gtrt ;  yt ;  ct ;  stg1t=0 and initial
conditions for the state variables (B0; K0; K
g
0 ; w 1; C 1), a symmetric De-
centralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) is dened to be a sequence of
allocations fYt; Ct; It; Ht; Kt+1; Kgt+1; Bt+1g1t=0 and prices

rkt ; r
b
t ; wt
	1
t=0
such that: (i) households maximize utility; (ii) rms maximize prots; (iii)
all markets clear; for instance, in the capital, labor and bond markets,
Kht = K
f
t = Kt; H
h
t = H
f
t = H t and B
h
t = Bt respectively; and (iv)
the government budget constraint given by (9a) and the motion equation for
public capital in (9b) are satised. Note that equilibrium quantities will be
denoted without the superscripts h and f .
We next transform the relevant quantities to stationary variables by den-
ing xt  X t=zt, where Xt  (Yt; Ct; It; Kt; Kgt ; Bt; Gct ; Git; Gtrt ). Accordingly,
small letters will denote quantities in per capita and e¢ ciency units. An ex-
ception is ht  H t; which is per capita work time. Also note that we dene
at  At. OurDCE derived in the previous sub-sections can now be rewritten
in stationary form as follows:
yt = at (kt)
1 (ht)
2 (kgt )
1 1 2 (10a)
yt = ct + it + g
c
t + g
i
t (10b)
zkt+1 = (1  p) kt + it   
p
2
(eit)2kt (10c)
wt = (wt 1)

 
2(1 + 
c
t)(ct   z ct 1)
1(1   yt )(1  ht)
!1 
(10d)
z(ct   z ct 1)1(1 ) 1(1  ht)2(1 )(gct )(1 1 2)(1 )
(1 +  ct)
(10e)
= eEt "zkt+1
 
(ct+1   z ct)1(1 ) 1(1  ht+1)2(1 )(gct+1)(1 1 2)(1 )
(1 +  ct+1)
!#
z(ct   z ct 1)1(1 ) 1(1  ht)2(1 )(gct )(1 1 2)(1 )
(1 +  ct)
(10f)
= eEt "zbt+1
 
(ct+1   z ct)1(1 ) 1(1  ht+1)2(1 )(gct+1)(1 1 2)(1 )
(1 +  ct+1)
!#
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zkgt+1 = (1  g) kgt + git  
g
2
 egit2 kgt (10g)
gct + g
i
t + g
tr
t + [1 + (1   yt )rbt ]bt = zbt+1 +  styt +  yt (1   st)yt +  ctct (10h)
where the stationary returns to capital and labor are:
rkt =
1 (1   st) yt
kt
(10i)
wt =
2 (1   st) yt
ht
(10j)
and where we dene: e  z(1 2)(1 )
eit  it
kt
  i
k
; egit  gitkgt   g
i
kg
zkt+1 
h
1  peiti
8><>: 1   yt+1 rkt+1 +
1  p + peit+1  it+1kt+1  p2 eit+12
1  peit+1
9>=>;
zbt+1  1 +
 
1   yt+1

rbt+1.
In other words, the stationary DCE is dened by the above system of
ten nonlinear stochastic di¤erence equations in fyt; ct; it; ht; kt+1; kgt+1; rbt ;
bt+1; wt; r
k
t g1t=0 for given paths of technology, fatg1t=0 and the independent
policy instruments, fgct ; git; gtrt ;  yt ;  ct ;  stg1t=0, whose evolution is explained
in the next sub-section.
2.6 The motion of technology and scal policy instru-
ments
Following most of the RBC literature, we assume that the stochastic process
determining at is an exponential rst-order Markov process
at = a
(1 a)
0 a
a
t 1e
"t (11)
where a0 > 0 is a constant, 0 < a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and
"t  iid(0; 2) are random shocks to productivity.
Also following e.g. Guo and Lansing (1998), Aloi et al. (2003), Andrés
and Doménech (2006), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Andrés et al.
(2008), the policy instrument rates (gct=yt; g
i
t=yt; g
tr
t =yt; 
y
t ; 
c
t ; 
s
t) follow
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feedback rules. These rules consist of an exogenous, or non-state contingent,
part and an endogenous, or state-contingent, part. Concerning the latter, we
assume that the scal authorities can react to deviations of output, yt; and
the public debt-to-output ratio, bt=yt; from their long-run values, y and b=y
respectively. The output gap, yt
y
, is the most common indicator of economic
activity, while the public debt-to-output ratio relative to its long-run value,
bt=yt
b=y
, is an indicator of public nances.13 The value of b=y will be assumed
to be 60% which is the reference value implicitly required by the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP). Note that our feedback policy rules are also in
accordance with Tanzis suggestion (Tanzi, CESifo Forum, 3/2005, p. 64)
that countercyclical scal policy should not be abandoned in depressions
and it could be tried in milder slowdowns when the scal accounts of a
country are in good initial conditions. Note nally that, despite the recent
loosening of the SGP, national policymakers continue to take into account
the scal accounts and imbalances.14
For the reasons discussed so far (see the Introduction and footnotes 5,
11 and 12 above), we assume that gtrt =yt, 
y
t , 
c
t and 
s
t do not contain a
state-contingent part. We also assume that the non state-contingent part of
all instruments, except  yt ; is a constant. This implies the following specic
policy rules:
gct
yt
= gc0

yt
y
gy0 yt=bt
y=b
gb0 yt 1
y
gy1 yt 1=bt 1
y=b
gb1
(12a)
git
yt
= gi0

yt
y
iy0 yt=bt
y=b
ib0 yt 1
y
iy1 yt 1=bt 1
y=b
ib1
(12b)
gtrt
yt
= gtr0 (12c)
 yt = (
y
0)
(1  )   yt 1 (12d)
 ct = 
c
0 (12e)
13When we undertake the welfare analysis below, we also explore the implications of
using the output growth gap instead of the output gap following Walsh (2003). While we
found that the rank ordering of welfare gains across countries generally remains unchanged,
the quantitative size of these gains is uniformly smaller when employing the output growth
gap. Hence we do not consider its use further.
14The CESifo DICE Report, 2/2004, pp. 85-86, points to other possible scal rules, not
considered in this study but which are used or being considered in various OECD countries.
For instance, there can also be ceilings on di¤erent items of government spending, or golden
rules stating that net government borrowing should not exceed net public investment.
Also, in the EU countries, there is the additional 3% of GDP ceiling on net government
borrowing.
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 st = 
s
0 (12f)
where the constants gc0, g
i
0, g
tr
0 represent the steady-state shares of each com-
ponent of public spending to output, and the constants  y0; 
c
0; 
s
0 are the
steady-state values of the three tax rates.15 The parameters gy0; 
g
b0; 
i
y0;
ib0; 
g
y1; 
g
b1; 
i
y1; 
i
b1 are feedback policy coe¢ cients, which can be positive,
negative or zero depending on whether the policy instrument rate is used
procyclically, countercyclically or acyclically.16
Equations (10a  j), jointly with equations (11) and (12a  f), summa-
rize the stationary DCE. Its long-run solution and linearized version are in
Appendices A and B respectively.17
3 The Parameterized Model
The models structural parameters relating to preferences, production and
capital accumulation are next calibrated using annual data for France, Ger-
many and the United Kingdom from 1970-2005. The individual country data
are obtained from the OECD, IMF and ECFIN. The OECD databases in-
clude: (i) Main Economic Indicators (MEI); (ii) Economic Outlook (EO);
and (iii) International Sectoral Database (ISDB). The IMF data is from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. E¤ective tax rates were
obtained from ECFIN.
3.1 Calibrated parameters
The parameters of our model and their calibrated values are listed in Table 1.
Average labours share, 2, is obtained directly from the ISDB dataset. An
approximate value across our 3-countries of 0.6 has also been used by Smets
15As said above, the at over time output subsidy,  s0 , is zero, except in the Rotemberg-
Woodford type of welfare analysis conducted in subsection 5.3 below. The other policy
constants are dened in subsection 3.2 below.
16Given the inherent delays in the conduct of scal policy in practice and the presence
of habits in our model, we have also added a one-period lag to the standard setup adopted
in the papers cited above. We will examine the welfare implications of the feedback rules
both without and with the lag below.
17We focus on two market distortions (persistence in wages and consumption - both
of which are not internalized by private agents) to justify active policy. Obviously, we
exclude many other distortions. For instance, we do not study non-market clearing, capital
market imperfections, market power, nominal rigidities, rule-of-thumb agents, etc. We also
assume homogeneous agents and hence solve for symmetric equilibria. As a result, our
policy instruments do not include unemployment benets, redistributive taxes in the form
of progressive taxation, etc.
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andWouters (2003) for the Euro Area aggregate. Private and public capitals
shares, 1 and (1   1   2) respectively, are obtained by decomposing the
implied aggregate capital share into private and public shares using average
private and public investment shares from the EO database. Our implied
values for the productivity of public capital, 0.053, 0.046, 0.015 for Germany,
France and the U.K. respectively, are similar in magnitude to those found in,
for example, Lansing (1998) for the US.
Table 1: Parameter Values
parameter Ger Fra Gbr denition
0 < 1 < 1 0.359 0.378 0.384 productivity of private capital
0 < 2 < 1 0.588 0.576 0.601 productivity of labor
p  0 2.000 2.000 2.000 adjustment costs on private capital
g  0 2.000 2.000 2.000 adjustment costs on public capital
0 <  < 1 0.963 0.968 0.976 rate of time preference
0  g  1 0.100 0.100 0.100 depreciation rate on public capital
0  p  1 0.100 0.100 0.100 depreciation rate on private capital
0    1 0.978 0.959 0.910 degree of real wage rigidity
0 < gc0 < 1 0.200 0.149 0.110 public consumption to output ratio
0 < gi0 < 1 0.029 0.030 0.011 public investment to output ratio
0 < 1 < 1 0.308 0.314 0.341 consumption weight in utility
0 < 2 < 1 0.592 0.586 0.559 leisure weight in utility
  1 2.000 2.000 2.000 degree of risk aversion
0   < 1 0.700 0.700 0.700 habit persistence parameter
0   c0 < 1 0.200 0.149 0.110 indirect tax rate
0   y0 < 1 0.313 0.303 0.287 direct tax rate
z  1 1.016 1.010 1.021 labor augmenting tech progress
Since we do not have data pertaining to capital adjustment costs and
given that our specication of these costs is based on Canova and De Nicoló
(2002), we follow their study and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002) and set
p = 2 for all countries. Note that in the absence of data, we adopt the
convention of xing the same parameter value across countries in order not
to bias the subsequent results and analysis. In other words, when the ap-
propriate data exists, we let it dene cross-country di¤erences in economic
structure.
Given the relationship between the gross real rate of interest and the
discount rate, i.e. (1 + r) = 1

, we use MEI data on ex-post real interest
rates to imply the values of  reported in Table 1. In light of the lack of
reliable depreciation rate data, following Smets and Wouters (2003), we set
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the private one to 10% per annum.18 We also applied the same rate to public
capital. In all cases, this contributed to producing reasonable private and
public capital to output ratios, e.g. private: 2.12, 2.56, 2.47 and public: 0.31,
0.31, 0.10 for Germany, France, and the U.K. respectively.
Following Kydland (1995, ch. 5, p. 134), we use data on average hours
worked, H, to imply the leisure weight in utility, 2 = 1   h, where h =
H=(7  14  52) is the average share of the total time endowment allocated
to work and H is obtained from the EO database. The normalization of
H to obtain h follows Jorgenson (1995) and Correia et al. (1995).19 Our
implied leisure weights reported in Table 1 are similar in magnitude to those
found in other calibration studies, see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995) for
the US. Given the lack of relevant data, we follow the study by Baier and
Glomm (2001) setting the relative weight of public consumption services at
(1 1 2) = 0:1 for all countries. Also following the literature, we set the
habit persistence parameter  equal to 0.7 for all countries. For example, this
value is the midpoint of the range reported by Smets and Wouters (2003)
for the Euro Area and Christiano et al. (2005) for the U.S. and equal to the
value reported by Batini et al. (2003) for the U.K.. The gross rate of labour
productivity, z, is calculated using ISDB data.
Finally, we obtain the wage persistence parameter, , via maximum like-
lihood estimation of (B:4) (see Appendix B) using real compensation data
from the MEI and IFS databases and the data mentioned above for ct, ht,
 yt and 
c
t .
20 To estimate (B:4), we take log deviations from an HP trend
for each of the series and condition on the relevant calibrated parameters
described above. All estimates of  reported in Table 1 above are signicant
at the 1% level. Our estimates of  which range from 0.91 to 0.98 appear in
line with others used in DSGE exercises. For example, Blanchard and Galí
(2007) set the persistence parameter of lagged once real wage equal to 0.9
and Christo¤el and Linzert (2005) set it between 0.9 and 0.97.
18Note that for Germany, Heer and Maussner (2005 p. 66) use an annualized deprecia-
tion rate of 0.0433. As a robustness check, we also use their rate when calculating welfare
and nd that our results do not signicantly change.
19The assumption is that 10 hours per day are necessary for physical needs physiological
timeand therefore do not count in the total hours available for the labor-leisure choice,
i.e. the remaining 14 hours.
20The data for income and consumption tax rates, yt and 
c
t ; are from Martinez-Mongay
(2000).
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3.2 Parameters for technology and the policy rules
In the subsequent analysis, we will consider shocks to productivity across
countries. Given that the resulting volatility in macroeconomic aggregates
depends on the size of the shock and the degree of persistence in the process
driving technology, we normalize these parameters across countries. To un-
derstand the di¤erential e¤ects on volatility, we x a at 0.95 and shock the
standard deviation of technology, a, by 1%.
Unless otherwise dened, the values of gc0; g
i
0; 
y
0 and 
c
0 in (12a  f) are
given in Table 1.21 Data for the public spending as shares of output for each
country are from EO. Data for income and consumption tax rates for each
country are from the ECFIN paper by Martinez-Mongay (2000). The income
rates reported in Table 1 are the weighted average of the e¤ective tax rates
on gross capital and employed labour.
We now turn to the reaction coe¢ cients in the scal policy instruments
(see equations 12a; b). Based on the empirical nding of Galí and Perotti
(2005) and Claeys (2006) and the lack of other robust estimates, we will
employ a range running from 0 to 0.2 for each country. Finally the AR para-
meters for the e¤ective tax rates,  in (12d) were obtained using the ECFIN
data. The estimates of  for France, Germany and the U.K. respectively
are: 0.944, 0.74 and 0.71 and are all signicant at the 1% level.
4 Model Evaluation
We next undertake an empirical assessment of the implications of our above
calibration and key modelling choices (i.e. to include habits in consumption,
wage rigidity and adjustment costs in private and public capital). To this
end, we compare both the autocovariance and impulse response functions
of our model to the data using the Watson (1993) and Christiano et al.
(2005) methods respectively.22 Both measures are based on a comparison of
an estimated VAR with our, in e¤ect, calibrated VAR. The baseline RBC
21To be more precise: (i) the constants gc0; g
i
0; 
y
0 are given by the data averages for
all t; (ii)  s0 is constant and is set either to zero, or to the value needed to undo a long-
run distortion in the Rotemberg-Woodford welfare measure (in subsection 5.2); (iii)  c0
is set either to the data average or to the value needed to undo a long-run distortion in
the Rotemberg-Woodford welfare measure; and (iv) we set gtr0 = 0 along the transition
path (in the long run, where public debt is set to be 0.6 of output, gtr0 becomes residually
endogenous to satisfy the government budget constraint (see e.g. (A:10) in the Appendix).
22Note that for this exercise, the values of the feedback parameters in various policy
rules are set to zero. Once we establish our preferred model based on the data, we proceed
in the next section to examine the welfare implications of the parameterized feedback
policy rules.
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model (with government) is dened as a special case of our model without
private and public capital adjustment costs, real wage rigidity and habits (i.e.
 = p = g =  = 0). To understand the implications in terms of model
t, we move from this baseline to our full DCE model by adding back in the
mechanisms which generate persistence and thus should have the e¤ect of
capturing some of the inertia observed in the actual data.
The data VAR is estimated using annual data from 1970-2005.23 To make
the VAR model as parsimonious as possible, we estimate a system consisting
of output, private investment, private consumption, and wages. Government
expenditure (consumption and investment) is calculated using the accounting
identity byt = !cbct+ !ibit+ !gbgt, and hours can be obtained from the relationbwt = byt   bht. This is possible since we can still obtain the spectral density
matrix for the data including output via the following transformation:
U =
0BBBBBB@
1
!g
  !i
!g
 !c
!g
0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0  1
1CCCCCCA ;Fg;y;i;c;w;h(!) = UFy;i;c;w(!)U
0;
where !c, !i, and !g are the average output weights of the three expenditure
components calculated from the data. For the impulse-response matrix 	 at
lag  , an equivalent transformation gives:
	g;y;i;c;w;h() = U	y;i;c;w()U
0:
4.1 Watson measure of t
The Watson (1993) method allows us to compare characteristics of the actual
data corresponding to our model with the data generated by our model.
Watson points out, in the context of models which are calibrated, that it is
important not to view the economic model as the data generating process,
but rather as an approximation to it. The essence of Watsons approach
is to determine the size of the stochastic error necessary to reconcile the
model-generated covariances with the sample covariances.
23As in Watson, the data (in logs) are pre-ltered using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
lter (smoothing weight: 100). In order to mimic the characteristics of a Baxter-King
(1999) ltered series, Ravn and Uhlig (2002) propose a smaller weight  = 6:25. Since we
apply the same transformation to both the model and the data spectrum, the choice of
the smoothing weight is not important.
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To briey illustrate the main points of the approach, consider an (n 1)
vector of stationary variables xt explained by an economic model, and its
empirical counterpart yt, with covariance generating functions Gx(z) and
Gy(z) respectively. Watsons method poses the following question, How
much error would have to be added to xt so that the autocovariances of
xt + ut are equal to the autocovariances of yt(see Watson, 1993, p. 1015).
This setup implies that the di¤erence between the model and the data can
be expressed as ut = yt   xt or Gu(z) = Gy(z) +Gx(z) Gyx(z) Gxy(z)
where Gu(z) is the covariance generating function for the di¤erence between
the model and the data.
To obtain the various covariance functions requires that we (i) estimate
Gy(z) from the data; (ii) calculateGx(z) from the model; (iii) chooseGxy(z)
to minimize the variance of ut, subject to the constraint that Gxy(z) is pos-
itive semi-denite.24 With these calculations in place, we can then derive
Watsons RMSAE. More specically we compute the ratio of the autospec-
trum of uj to the autospectrum of yj:25
Rj(!) =
R 
 Gu(exp ( i!))jjd!R 

Gy(exp ( i!))jjd!
: (13)
This measure is conceptually similar to the unexplained variance of a
standard regression. Although it is not bounded between zero and unity,
smaller values do imply a better model approximation to the data that larger
ones. Finally, note that in all the results reported below, for any variable j,
we use the entire range of the spectrum, i.e. [  ].26
To assess the statistical signicance of the t measure, we generate 1000
replications for each model (non-parametric bootstrap). Based on these repli-
cations, we obtain the empirical distribution for the t measure given in (13),
which we then compare with the performance of the baseline model ( =  =
g = p = 0). To calculate the model spectrum including output, consump-
tion, investment, government expenditure and hours of work from the full
calibrated model spectrum (12 variables), we use a (5 12) selection matrix
E with ones in the appropriate position such that Fx(!) = EF1212(!)E0.27
24In other words, the spectrum, Fxy(!), is positive semi-denite.
25The spectrum is given as F(!) = 12G (exp( i!)) (see, Hamilton, 1994, Sections 3.6,
10.3).
26Note that this measure can also be calculated at any frequency ! or between desired
ranges [!1; !2] . Since all variables are equally important when calculating the goodness
of tmeasure, we weight them equally (see, e.g. Watson 1993, p. 1018).
27We follow Uhlig (1999) and lter the model spectrum using the power transfer function
of the HP-lter with the same smoothing weight as the data.
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4.2 Christiano et al. (2005) measure of t
A complementary exercise, which can shed further light into the issue of
model t, can be carried out using the methods developed in Christiano et al.
(2005). In contrast to the emphasis on autocovariances as carried out above,
we now concentrate on our models impulse responses relative to those of a
similarly identied VAR model of the data. Let  ^j be a vector of impulse
responses for lags 1; :::; 5 of variable j to an identied technology shock,
and  ()j the corresponding model responses dependent on the calibrated
parameter vector . Christiano et al. propose the weighted sum of squared
deviations:
 =

 ^j   ()j

V 1

 ^j   ()j
0
(14)
which is minimized with respect to the parameter vector . We use it to com-
pare the four versions of the model (adjustment cost, habits, wage rigidity,
full model) with the baseline RBC model. The matrix V has the variances
of the data impulse-responses on the diagonal. In our case, they are calcu-
lated from 1000 non-parametric bootstrap replications of the estimated VAR.
The model impulse responses are calculated in the same way as the model
spectrum, using a (5  12) selection matrix E with ones in the appropriate
position.
4.3 Results: autocovariance functions
The results reported in Tables 2a-2c are in percent di¤erences from the base-
line RBC model. Accordingly, a positive value denotes the percent improve-
ment in t across models and vice-versa for negative values. The numbers
in parentheses are the bootstrap standard errors.28
The sign of the results for the French case indicate (excluding adjustment
costs for all variables expect hours) an improvement in t for all variables
and all models. Note that the full model t is uniformly better than the base
with the largest gains accruing to bht and bgt followed by byt, bct bit and bwt.
In the German case, adjustment costs again do not improve model t
relative to the base but as in the French case, there is a statistically signicant
improvement in t for all other variables across the remaining models (except
hours in the habits model). Comparing the full model t in Table 2b with
that in Tables 2a and 2c reveals that the improvement in model t for the
full model is, on average, quantitatively the largest for Germany followed by
France and the U.K. respectively.
28In Table 2 all results are statistically signicant at the 1% level unless otherwise
indicated by ns.
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Table 2a: Model Fit France (ACFs)
adj. costs habits wage rigidity full modelbyt -0.076 0.049 2.138 0.855
(0:006) (0:004) (0:172) (0:069)bit -0.209 0.239 1.641 0.776
(0:024) (0:028) (0:190) (0:090)bct -0.033 0.025 1.943 0.817
(0:003) (0:002) (0:186) (0:078)bgt -0.095 0.061 2.670 1.067
(0:001) (0:001) (0:029) (0:012)bht 0.109 -0.032 5.188 1.947
(0:003) (0:008) (1:353) (0:509)bwt -0.096 0.109 0.538 0.167
(0:001) (0:001) (0:007) (0:002)
Table 2b: Model Fit Germany (ACFs)
adj. costs habits wage rigidity full modelbyt -0.064 0.058 5.119 2.225
(0:007) (0:006) (0:522) (0:227)bit -0.250 0.308 3.748 1.852
(0:020) (0:025) (0:306) (0:151)bct -0.021 0.029 4.545 2.009
(0:003) (0:005) (0:695) (0:307)bgt -0.076 0.069 6.108 2.654
(0:005) (0:004) (0:375) (0:163)bht -0.005 -0.009 13.323 5.461
(0:002) (0:003) (3:662) (1:501)bwt -0.091 0.105 0.766 0.293
(0:003) (0:004) (0:026) (0:010)
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Table 2c: Model Fit U.K. (ACFs)
adj. costs habits wage rigidity full modelbyt -0.206 0.047 0.619 0.218
(0:070) (0:008) (0:110) (0:039)bit -0.381 0.223 0.663 0.285
(1:468)ns (0:038) (0:112) (0:048)bct -0.089 0.021 0.431 0.171
(0:844)ns (0:005) (0:099) (0:039)bgt -0.330 0.075 0.990 0.349
(0:014) (0:002) (0:024) (0:009)bht -0.006 -0.007 1.264 0.414
(0:758)ns (0:003) (0:403) (0:133)bwt -0.287 0.105 0.278 0.057
(0:041) (0:004) (0:011) (0:002)
Finally, the U.K. case appears to follow a similar pattern to the French
and German results. In particular, the adjustment costs model leads to a
signicant deterioration in t for all variables except bit and bct (which are not
signicant, ns) and to a worse t for hours in the habits model. Otherwise,
the remaining results show a statistically signicant improvement in t for
all variables and models.
Overall the results in Table 2 provide an interesting picture and some
empirical support for several of our key modelling choices. First, the presence
of both real wage rigidity and habits (except for hours) improves model t
for all countries both in the marginal and full model cases. Second, despite
adjustment costs not performing well when considered in isolation, they do
not adversely a¤ect the full model results.
4.4 Results: impulse response functions
To obtain the measures of t reported in Table 3, we examine the percent
di¤erence between  (see equation 14) for each of our four model specica-
tions and the  for the baseline RBC model. Since lower values of  imply
a better t between the model and data impulse responses than higher ones,
negative values in Table 3 imply the model under consideration ts the data
better than the baseline RBC model. It is worth noting that the ACF based
measure of t, calculated in Table 2, is broadly analogous to an overall mea-
sure of t in standard regression analysis and the impulse responses based
measure reported below is akin to partial measures of t. Hence the two
measures should be interpreted as complements and not substitutes.
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The broad message across all three countries is that the marginal models
for adjustment costs (except for bgt in France, bct and bwt in Germany and the
U.K.) and habits (except for bit in the U.K.) do not improve the model t
for the impulse response based measure. However the sticky real wage and
full models appear to t better than the base RBC model for the majority
of variables for each country.
If we concentrate on the full model in Tables 2 and 3, the preponderance
of evidence is supportive of our key modeling choices. Accordingly, based
on these ndings, the stylized facts regarding the key sources of persistence
for France, Germany and the U.K. and the general modelling practice in
the DSGE literature, we retain each source of rigidity in the analysis which
follows.
Table 3a: Model Fit France (IRs)
adj. costs habits wage rigidity full modelbyt 0.12 0.01 -0.09 -0.09bit 0.71 0.17 -0.04 0.06bct 0.45 0.16 -0.21 -0.07bgt -0.14 0.00 1.49 1.49bht 0.15 0.05 -0.17 -0.21bct 2.10 0.40 -0.63 -0.75
Table 3b: Model Fit Germany (IRs)
adj. costs habits wage rigidity full modelbyt 0.04 0.00 -0.18 -0.17bit 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.34bct -0.07 0.13 -0.26 -0.11bgt 0.04 0.01 0.89 1.15bht 0.02 0.06 -0.55 -0.56bwt -0.10 0.21 -0.86 -0.76
Table 3c: Model Fit U.K. (IRs)
adj. costs habits wage rigidity full modelbyt 0.02 0.00 -0.16 -0.13bit 0.10 -0.01 -0.28 -0.20bct -0.04 0.07 -0.12 -0.06bgt 0.01 0.00 0.41 0.22bht 0.02 0.03 -0.34 -0.26bwt -0.11 0.21 0.02 0.06
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4.4.1 Model vs empirical impulse response functions
To shed further light on the properties of the model relative to the data
over the business cycle range, we next present the full models responses to
a one-percent shock to technology (see Figure 1). The sub-plots in Figure 1
are constructed using the same set of variables contained in Tables (2a-3c)
and include plots of the 95-percent condence regions for both the model
and data VAR impulse response functions.29 These regions are useful for
establishing whether there is a statistically signicant di¤erence between the
impulse response functions of the model and the data. The light and dark
grey regions in the gures represent the model and the data respectively. If
the regions do not overlap, as shown by white space between the grey regions,
then we can conclude that there is a signicant di¤erence between the model
and the data.
[Figure 1 here]
The results reported in Figure 1 generally suggest that the data VAR con-
tains relatively more cyclical responses to the technology shock whereas the
models responses are relatively more persistent. However, despite these dif-
ferences, there are only two instances where the two sets of impulse response
functions signicantly di¤er. These occur for the wage rate in France at lags
1-2 and also in the U.K. at lag 1. Thus the model impulse responses do not
appear to be inconsistent with the data as depicted by the VAR model.
5 Welfare and Fiscal Stabilization
We now turn to a formal welfare ranking of the two policy regimes (i.e. pas-
sive versus active) to determine whether policymakers should act or not and,
if so, by how much and to which state variable. To carry out this analysis,
we rst solve for a compensating consumption supplement that can make
welfare equal in the two policy regimes (see, e.g. Lucas (1990)). The value
of this supplement will provide us with a measure of the welfare di¤erence
between the two policy regimes expressed as a share of private consumption.
To calculate this requires a measure of aggregate welfare (dened as expected
discounted lifetime utility) under passive and active policy. We will follow
two approaches to obtain these measures, both based on the popular linear-
quadratic local tradition. Then, with these measures in place, we will subject
29Note that 1000 simulations were employed to obtain each condence region. We use
asymmetric 95 per cent condence intervals based on Davidson and MacKinnon (1993,
p.766).
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the model to a series of stochastic productivity shocks (i.e. 1000 per exper-
iment) to understand the quantitative welfare implications of moving from
passive to active scal policy. In light of the necessary condition for scal
solvency, we will evaluate one instrument and one target per experiment.
5.1 Compensating consumption supplement
Let W p denote the expected discounted lifetime utility that the household
enjoys under passive policy, and W a denote the same under active policy
other things equal. When variables are re-expressed in stationary form (see
our notation in sub-section 2.5), and since Zt = zt, equations (1) and (2)
imply:
W j  E0
1X
t=0
tUh;jt = E0
1X
t=0
et[ (cjt   z cjt 1)1(1 )(1  hjt)2(1 )
1  
 (gc;jt )(1 1 2)(1 )] (15)
where the superscripts j = p; a denote outcomes under the passive and active
policy regime respectively, and 0 < e  z(1 2)(1 ) < 1.
Working as in e.g. Lucas (1990), we assume a compensating consumption
supplement at each date t under the active policy regime that is proportional
by  to private consumption under the passive reference regime and makes
W a = W p. Thus,  is such that:
W a = E0
1X
t=0
et[ (1 + )1(1 ) (cpt   z cpt 1)1(1 )(1  hpt )2(1 )
1  
gc;pt )(1 1 2)(1 )].
The relationship between welfare in the active and passive cases can then
be given by:
W a
W p
= (1 + )1(1 )
or
 =

W a
W p
 1
1(1 )   1. (16)
Therefore, if  > 0, there is a welfare gain of moving from passive to active
policy and vice versa for  < 0. But to obtain an estimate of , we rst need
to obtain estimates of W a and W p: To do so, we will use two measures of
welfare.
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5.2 A rst welfare measure (socially optimal steady-
state)
We start by applying the welfare measure introduced by Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997). The advantage of this approach is that it addresses a well-
recognized problem that a second-order approximation of the within-period
utility function may not be consistent with a rst-order approximation to
the equilibrium solution of the endogenous variables due to the presence of
linear (deviation) terms in the former (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford,
1997, and Woodford, 2003, pp. 383-7).
To derive a purely quadratic approximation to utility (see equation (C:14)
in the Appendix), the method requires that the long-run equilibrium, around
which we approximate, is socially optimal. That is, in the long-run, the econ-
omy reproduces the real allocations of the social planner. This is achieved
by deriving a set of policy rules for the long-run DCE economy which mimics
the allocations of the social planners.30 In our setup, this is achieved in the
steady-state by: (i) using an output subsidy to o¤set the distortion resulting
from the income tax (see equation (C:11a)); (ii) using a consumption tax
rate to o¤set the distortion from not internalizing habit persistence in the
decentralized solution (see equation (C:11b));31 and (iii) setting public con-
sumption and public investment, as shares of output, to their socially optimal
values (see equations C:10j and C:10k). We then use the times-paths of pri-
vate consumption, leisure and public consumption, as derived by solving the
rst-order approximate system in Appendix B32, and substitute them into
(C:14) to obtain the expected discounted lifetime utility.
5.3 A second welfare measure (distorted steady-state)
We also obtain estimates ofW a andW p; and hence , by working in the area
of the distorted long-run DCE. The advantage of using this measure of wel-
fare, in contrast to the one described above, is that a distorted steady-state is
a more realistic point around which to approximate welfare. Moreover, given
that the e¤ects of distortions on welfare increase with the size of distortions,
we expect the welfare e¤ects of active vs. passive policy to be relatively
30The same procedure has been used in various forms by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) and more recently by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) who use the output subsidy to
undo the distortion resulting from monopolistic power in the long-run.
31Recall that the wage setting equation (8) is specied so that there are no wage distor-
tions in the long-run.
32This approximation is also taken around the steady-state of the social planner.
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higher when using this method.33
To obtain this measure of welfare (see equation (D:1) in the Appendices),
so that it is comparable with (C:14), we derive a second-order approximation
to utility around the steady-state of the DCE derived in Appendix A.We then
use the times-paths of private consumption, leisure and public consumption,
as derived by solving the rst-order approximate system in Appendix B34,
and substitute them into (D:1) to obtain the expected discounted lifetime
utility.
5.4 Welfare results
Before we apply the above two welfare measures, recall that the policy in-
struments that respond to innovations in the state of the economy are pub-
lic consumption and public investment as shares of output (see equations
(12a   b) above). Moreover, these two shares are linked to the output gap
and the public debt-to-output target. The detailed results reported below
concentrate on the former policy instrument and target only, since public
investment yielded negligible welfare results quantitatively35 and the debt
target led to local indeterminacy36 across a large range of reaction coe¢ -
cients considered.37
33We are grateful to the Editor and an anonymous referee for suggesting this measure.
34This approximation is also taken around the steady-state of the DCE.
35Perhaps this occurs because its output share is small in all three countries. Also,
changes in public investment have direct allocation e¤ects that mitigate any potential
stabilizing benets.
36This happens because reaction to public debt requires a stronger countercyclical action
than reaction to the output gap. To understand this, consider equation (12a): Say that
yt is above its long-run value and the government has to reduce public spending as share
of output to slow the economy. Ceteris paribus, this can happen even if gt rises; we only
need the ratio gt=yt to fall; and vice versa when yt is below its long-run value. Now say
that bt=yt is above its long-run target. Ceteris paribus (i.e. given yt), the required fall in
gt=yt implies a fall in gt; and vice versa when bt=yt is below its long-run target. In other
words, the required countercyclical action in gt is stronger when we respond to the debt
target than to the output gap. Given this, it is not surprising that reaction to debt creates
indeterminacy problems (see also Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997 who nd that more
countercyclical policies have a greater likelihood of being indeterminate in equilibrium).
37Note that for the solution linearized around the social planners steady-state, the
only possible values of gb0 and 
g
b1 which lead to saddle-path stable solutions are zero.
In contrast, for the solution around the distorted steady-state, saddle-path stability can
be found for parameter congurations containing non-zero debt reactions in 12.8, 8 and
16 percent of the cases for France, Germany and the UK respectively. Since we aim to
focus on "implementable" rules (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007, p. 1704), we exclude
further consideration of the debt target. By focusing only on policies which robustly deliver
unique equilibria, we avoid potential dilemmas for policy makers who might inadvertently
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5.4.1 Welfare and size of policy reaction (current output gaps)
Using equations (C:14); which is around the socially optimal steady-state,
and (D:1), which is around the distorted steady-state, we rst report the
welfare implications of active versus passive policy in Figures 2 and 3 respec-
tively (using government consumption as a share of output to respond to the
current output gap).
Figure 2 suggests that the welfare gains from countercyclical scal action
are highest for Germany followed by France and then by the U.K.. More-
over, the welfare gains for each country increase monotonically in the range
we consider for higher values of the policy reaction coe¢ cient, with the high-
est ones being experienced when gy0 = 0:2: The rank ordering of welfare
gains suggested by Figure 2 is expected and consistent with the extent of
non-internalized market distortions along the transition path to the socially
optimum long-run in each country. For example, examination of Table 1
reveals that Germany has the highest wage rigidity.38
[Figures 2 and 3 here]
If we now turn to results in the area of the distorted long-run in Fig-
ure 3, the rst thing to note is that the welfare gains from countercyclical
scal action are greater than their corresponding values in Figure 2. The
larger welfare gains in Figure 3 can be explained by the fact that more non-
internalised distortions are at work relative to the socially optimal case in
Figure 2. These di¤erences in distortions are now present both in the steady-
state and along the transition path. For example, consumption habits were
internalized in the steady-state of Figure 2, but are not in the steady-state
of Figure 3. In addition, public spending is not optimally determined, and
the distortions associated with the income and consumption taxes are not
undone, in the steady-state of Figure 3. Finally, tax rates are not at their
socially optimal values along the transition path in Figure 3.39
Another interesting contrast between Figures 2 and 3 is that the cross-
country ordering of welfare gains from active policy changes. For example
in Figure 3, the U.K. gains the most instead of the least, whilst the German
gains are still greater than the French. A possible explanation for the change
in the U.K. position around the distorted long-run case is that (with ad
hoc policies and with a relatively small size of government sector) its ability
parameterize a non-implementable rule.
38Recall that the other non-internalised market distortion, habits, are calibrated to the
same value for all countries, i.e.  = 0:7.
39Note however that there are market distortions (wage persistence and consumption
habits) along the transition path in both Figures 1 and 2.
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for automatic stabilization is lower than in both France and Germany. For
instance, all of its spending shares and tax rates (see Table 1 above), are
relatively lower than the corresponding magnitudes in France and Germany.
Then, in Figure 3, since automatic stabilizers can do relatively less work in
the U.K. than in the other two countries considered, there is more scope for
gains from active policy intervention for the U.K.. In other words, although
the U.K. is the least distorted economy in our setup, it is in most need
of countercyclical scal action because of inadequate automatic stabilizers.40
Germany still benets more than France since it is more distorted (at both the
market and policy level). In other words, despite its bigger government size
and automatic stabilizers, Germanys distortions also necessitate a stronger
active policy intervention than in France. It should be pointed out that
the government size plays its conventional automatic stabilizing role only in
Figure 3, where policies are exogenous. This di¤ers from the case in Figure
2, where the analysis was around a solution in which the government size
was optimally chosen on e¢ ciency grounds in a non-stochastic non-distorted
long-run environment.
5.4.2 Welfare and size of policy reaction (current and lagged out-
put gaps)
To further explore the welfare implications of active versus passive scal pol-
icy, we next use the public consumption reaction function with both current
and lagged output gaps (see (12a) above). These results are reported in Ta-
ble 4. The rst thing to note is that welfare gains increase when we react to
both gaps and raise the degree of reaction, at least in the range of parame-
ter values reported here. Note that the magnitude of peak welfare gains (in
bold) are substantially higher for each country across both welfare measures.
Further, note that the within- and across-measure country welfare rankings
are the same as reported in Figures 2 and 3. Also, welfare around the optimal
steady-state are lower than their corresponding values around the distorted
one, again as in Figures 2 and 3. Thus, it appears that reasonable sized wel-
fare gains can be expected when business cycle uctuations, induced by TFP
shocks, are smoothed by using a reaction function for public consumption
that takes account of both current and past output gaps.
The magnitude of welfare gains from countercyclical action are quite
small when evaluated around the socially optimum long-run (e.g. they reach
0.008% of private consumption for Germany), but noticeably larger when
evaluated around the distorted long-run (e.g. they reach 0.278% of private
40Andrés et al. (2008) also nd that output and consumption volatility fall with the
size of the government sector, provided there is a variety of frictions.
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consumption for the U.K.). We report that the e¤ects in the distorted long-
run case can rise to nearly 1% of consumption when a permanent 1% produc-
tivity shock is considered instead of the temporary one applied in Table 4.41
We are aware, of course, that there can be combinations of distortions that
may produce bigger quantitative e¤ects depending on the model considered.
Heathcote (2005), for instance, studies the e¤ects of changes in tax policy
in an economy with heterogeneous agents and credit constraints and nds
substantial e¤ects on aggregate consumption. However, it is worth noting
that he focuses on consumption and partly on investment, while our study
is based on welfare that is a¤ected by more endogenous variables and hence
contains more compositional e¤ects. For instance, stabilizing one variable
may be achieved at the cost of destabilizing another.
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
0.05 0.021 0.032 0.042 0.052 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
0.10 0.031 0.042 0.052 0.061 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
0.15 0.041 0.051 0.061 0.070 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
0.20 0.050 0.060 0.069 0.079 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
Reaction 0.05 0.068 0.101 0.134 0.166 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004
coefficient 0.10 0.098 0.131 0.163 0.194 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005
0.15 0.129 0.161 0.192 0.221 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006
0.20 0.158 0.189 0.219 0.248 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008
0.05 0.075 0.112 0.147 0.182 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.10 0.111 0.147 0.181 0.215 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
0.15 0.146 0.180 0.214 0.247 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
0.20 0.180 0.214 0.246 0.278 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
GER
UK
distorted steady-state
Table 4: Net welfare from fiscal stabilistion of 1% temporary productivity shock
optimal steady-state
Reaction coefficient lag
FRA
5.4.3 Welfare and size of market distortion
To shed further light into the quantitative relationship between potential
welfare gains from active policy and market distortions, we next condition
on xed values of the reaction coe¢ cients (i.e. 0.2 for both the current and
lagged-once output gap) and allow wage rigidity, , to vary in the vicinity
41If such gains appear small, recall that when Lucas (1990) compares the US economy,
which has a capital income tax rate around 0.36, to the Ramsey case in which the capital
income tax rate drops to zero, he nds a welfare gain of around 2%.
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of the base calibration reported in Table 1.42 Figures 4 and 5 show respec-
tively the case around the socially optimal steady-state and the case around
the distorted steady-state. Note that, in these experiments, the three coun-
tries have exactly the same degree of non-internalized market distortions, so
they di¤er only in policy distortions, government size and other technology-
preferences characteristics. The main result is that the higher is , the higher
the gain from active policy in all three countries. This result is intuitive, i.e.
the higher the degree of a particular market distortion, the stronger the ar-
gument for countercyclical policy action.
[Figures 4-5 here]
Concerning the cross-country ordering of welfare gains from active policy,
Figure 4 is like Figure 2, although the magnitude of welfare di¤erences across
countries is smaller than in Figure 2. In Figure 4, di¤erences in welfare are
driven by country characteristics other than wage and consumption rigidities.
In Figure 5, welfare gains from active policy are highest for Germany again,
while the U.K. gains are now greater than the French. Germany seems to
be the most distorted economy, even when we assume that non-internalized
market distortions are the same. The U.K. benets more than France be-
cause active scal action makes up for inadequate automatic stabilizers, as
discussed in Figure 3.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied two of the main responsibilities of the government,
namely the stabilization of the macroeconomy, as well as the re-allocation of
resources via the provision of public goods and services, in the EU-3.
To this end, we developed a DSGE model which (i) allowed scal policy
instruments to react to two key fundamentals, i.e. cyclical output and public
debt; (ii) justied feedback policy by assuming real wage rigidity, which is
widely believed to be one of the main scleroses in Europe, and persistence
in consumption habits; (iii) deliberately employed a minimal setup where
42To conserve space, we do not report the experiment for habits as well, since the welfare
gains are quantitative negligible for higher values of  in the optimal case and can actually
fall slightly in the distorted case. To explain the latter nding recall that (i) in the long
run, private consumption, and hence utility, decrease in  (see the expression for small u in
the Appendix under C.2); (ii) consumption habits and the e¤ects of  are not internalized
(as they are in the area of the long run socially optimum); and (iii) since active policy tries
to close the gap between current values and long-run values, and long-run utility decreases
with ; it is natural that lifetime utility also decreases with :
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the only distorting e¤ect from the part of policy was the non-availability of
lump-sum policy instruments; (iv) studied how each scal policy instrument,
as well as the choice between an output gap target and a public nance
target, (de)stabilize the economy, where by stabilization we mean both the
internal stability of the system and the standard deviation of macroeconomic
variables when the economy is subjected to supply shocks; (v) calculated the
general equilibrium welfare di¤erence when moving from passive to active
policy for each policy instrument and each target.
The main policy messages arising from our study are that (i) policymakers
should avoid using tax rates for countercyclical policy because it usually leads
to indeterminacy; (ii) reaction to a public debt-to-ouput target can also lead
to indeterminacy or produce negligible welfare benets; (iii) using public
investment for stabilization also yields negligible welfare benets, probably
because its output share is very small in the data; (iv) the most e¤ective
instrument-target combination is to use public consumption spending, as a
share of output, to stabilize the output gap; (v) the higher the degree of a
wage rigidity, the stronger the argument for countercyclical scal action; and
(vi) since active policy and automatic stabilizers are substitutes, it is possible
that relatively undistorted economies may be in much need of countercyclical
scal action because of inadequate automatic stabilizers.
A natural extension is to introduce more distortions (at market and/or
policy level) and reevaluate the desirability of active versus passive policy.
In general, the design of tax-spending policies, and in particular the policy
instruments and targets (if any) for the government to use in an attempt to
ne-tune the economy, remains at the heart of macroeconomics.
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Appendix A: Steady-state of DCE
In the long-run, all variables in sub-sections 2.5 and 2.6 do not change
and there are no shocks. For any variable xt, let x denote its long-run value.
This implies that a = a0; gc = gc0y; g
i = gi0y; g
tr = gtr0 y; 
y =  y0; 
c =  c0 and
 s =  s0. Straightforward substitutions in equations (10a  j) imply that the
long-run solution for
 
h; y; c; i; k; kg; rk; w; rb; gtr0

is:43
h =
21 (1   y0) (1   s0)
21 (1   y0) (1   s0) + 2(1 +  c0)
 
1  
z

c
y
(A:1)
y =
"
a0
 
1e (1   y0) (1   s0)
z   e (1  p)
!1
(h)2

gi0
z + g   1
1 1 2#1=2
(A:2)
c =
 
1  gc0   gi0  
1e (1   y0) (1   s0) (z + p   1)
z   e(1  p)
!
y (A:3)
i =
 
1e (1   y0) (1   s0) (z + p   1)
z   e(1  p)
!
y (A:4)
k =
 
1e (1   y0) (1   s0)
z   e(1  p)
!
y (A:5)
kg =

gi0
z + g   1

y (A:6)
rk =
1 (1   s0) y
k
(A:7)
w =
2 (1   s0) y
h
(A:8)
rb =
z   ee (1   y0) (A:9)
gtr0 = 0:6z

1  1e

  gc0   gi0 +  s0 +  y0(1   s0) +
c
y
 c0 (A:10)
where e  z(1 2)(1 ):
43As discussed in the text, consistent with the SGP, we set b = 0:6y in the long run. This
implies that, one of the other scal policy instruments has to become endogenous to satisfy
the government budget constraint. Here we choose, to residually determine government
transfers as a share of GDP, gtr0 .
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Appendix B: 1st-order approximate DCE
We take a rst-order Taylor series expansion of the stationary DCE in
sub-sections 2.5 and 2.6 around steady-state to obtain the following rst-
order representation:
byt = bat + 1bkt + 2bht + (1  1   2)bkgt (B:1)
byt = c
y
bct + i
y
bit + gc0bgct + gi0bgit (B:2)
zbkt+1 = (1  p)bkt + i
k
bit (B:3)
Et bwt+1 =  bwt + (1  ) 
1  
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Etbct+1   
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gc0bgct + gi0bgit + gtr0 bgtrt + ze bybbt + (1   y0) rb bybrbt (B:7)
= z
b
y
bbt+1 +  y0 1 + rb by    s0
b yt + [ s0 +  y0(1   s0)]byt
+ s0(1   y0)b st +  c0 cybct +  c0 cyb ct
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Etbrkt+1 = Etbyt+1   bkt+1 (B:8)
ze   1

Etbrbt+1 =  ze   1 + p

Etbrkt+1    p y01   y0

Etb yt+1 (B:9)
 p i
k
ze
bit   bkt+ p i
k
(1  p + i
k
)

Etbit+1   bkt+1
bwt = byt   bht (B:10)b t+1 = bct (B:11)
where for any variable xt; xt xx ' ln(xt=x)  bxt is a rst-order Taylor ap-
proximation and x is the long-run value of xt. Note that (B:11) denes an
auxiliary variable used for lagged-once consumption in (B:5):
Log-linearizing the stationary laws of motion for the scal policy instru-
ments in sub-section 2.6 around the steady-state yields44:
bgct =  1 + gy0   gb0 byt + gb0bbt (B:12)
bgit =  1 + iy0   ib0 byt + ib0bbt (B:13)bgtrt = byt (B:14)b yt = b yt 1 (B:15)
Finally, the log-linearized process for technology in (11) is given by:
bat = abat 1 + "t (B:16)
Appendix C: 2nd-order approximate welfare
(socially optimal steady-state)
In this Appendix, we construct a welfare measure by following the method-
ology introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). This measure will
have the characteristics discussed in sub-section 5.2. We work as usually
in the related literature. Thus, (a) we rst derive the second-order approx-
imation of the within-period stationary utility function (b) we derive the
second-order approximation of the economys constraints; (c) we use the lat-
ter into the approximate utility derived in (a); (d) we solve the social plan-
ners problem and then derive the long-run values of the output subsidy and
the consumption tax rate that can help to make the long-run DCE equiva-
lent to the long-run solution of the social planners problem; (e) we use steps
(a-d) to obtain a measure of utility that depends only on quadratic terms.
44To save on space, equations (B:12  13) are written with response to current targets
only.
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2nd-order approximation of within-period utility
We start by re-expressing household h0s instantaneous utility function,
(2), in stationary form. Using our notation in sub-section 2.5 and since
Zt = z
t, we have for (2) omitting h-superscripts in a symmetric equilibrium:
Ut = z
(1 2)(1 )t[
(ct   z ct 1)1(1 )(1  ht)2(1 )
1   (C:1)
(gct )
(1 1 2)(1 )]
Hence, intertemporal welfare in (1) can be re-expressed as:
E0
1X
t=0
(e)tut (C:2)
where 0 < e  z(1 2)(1 ) < 1 can be thought as the e¤ective discount
rate and we dene ut  (ct 

z
ct 1)1(1 )(1 ht)2(1 )(gct )(1 1 2)(1 )
1  .
The second-order approximation of ut around its long-run value, u, is
(variables without time subscripts denote long-run values):
ut ' u+

[
@ut
@ct
+ e@ut+1
@ct
]c
bct + @ut
@ht
h
bht + @ut
@gct
gc
bgct (C:3)
+
1
2

[
@ut
@ct
+ e@ut+1
@ct
]c+ [
@2ut
@c2t
+ e@u2t+1
@c2t
]c2

(bct)2
+
1
2

@ut
@ht
h+
@2ut
@h2t
h2

(bht)2 + 1
2

@ut
@gct
gc +
@2ut
@gc2t
(gc)2

(bgct )2
+

@2ut
@ct@ht
ch
bctbht +  @2ut
@ct@gct
cgc
bctbgct
+

@2ut
@ht@gct
hgc
bhtbgct +O[3]
where for any variable xt, bxt  ln(xt=x); xt xx ' bxt + 12 (bxt)2; at t, we take
ct 1 as given, while we take into account how the choice of ct a¤ects next
periods utility (i.e. as also done by the social planner - see below), and
we set the given ct 1 at its long-run value; all partial derivatives in (C:3)
are specied by using the functional form in (2) and are then evaluated at
a long-run; O[3] contains all terms of order higher than two (following the
literature, from here forward, these terms will be omitted).
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2nd-order approximation of economys constraints
A second-order approximation of the economys stationary constraints
around their steady-state is:45
byt = bat + 1bkt + 2bht + (1  1   2)bkgt (C:4)
c
y
bct ' byt   i
y
bit   gc
y
bgct   giy bgit   (C:5)
 1
2

c
y
(bct)2 + i
y
bit2 + gc
y
(bgct )2 + giy  bgit2   (byt)2

i
k
bit ' zbkt+1   (1  p)bkt + (C:6)
+
1
2

z
bkt+12   (1  p)bkt2   i
k
bit2
gi
kg
bgit ' zbkgt+1   (1  g)bkgt + (C:7)
+
1
2

z
bkgt+12   (1  g)bkgt 2   gikg  bgit2

where gc = gc0y and g
i = gi0y.
It is straightforward to show that equations (C:4   C:7) imply that we
have for bct in a second-order approximation:
bct ' y
c
[bat + 2bht   gc
y
bgct   ky fzbkt+1   [1  p + 1yk ]bkt   12z (1  p)
k
i
bkt+1   bkt2g   kg
y
fzbkgt+1   [1  g + (1  1   2) ykg ]bkgt   12z
(1  g) k
g
gi
bkgt+1   bkgt 2g   12[ cy (bct)2 + iy bit2 + gcy (bgct )2 +
gi
y
 bgit2   (byt)2]] (C:8)
45Note that relevant constraints include the production function, (10a), the resource
constraint, (10b); and the two capital evolution equations, (10c) and (10g). Further note
that (C:4) is an exact expression.
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2nd-order approximation of utility (revisited)
Using (C:8) for bct into (C:3), the latter becomes:
ut ' u+

[
@ut
@ct
+ e@ut+1
@ct
]c

y
c
[bat + 2bht   gc
y
bgct   ky fzbkt+1 (C:9)
 [1  p + 1y
k
]bkt   1
2
z (1  p) k
i
bkt+1   bkt2g   kg
y
fzbkgt+1
 [1  g + (1  1   2) y
kg
]bkgt   12z (1  g) kggi bkgt+1   bkgt 2g
 1
2
[
c
y
(bct)2 + i
y
bit2 + gc
y
(bgct )2 + giy  bgit2   (byt)2]] +

@ut
@ht
h
bht
+

@ut
@gct
gc
bgct + 12

[
@ut
@ct
+ e@ut+1
@ct
]c+ [
@2ut
@c2t
+ e@u2t+1
@c2t
]c2

(bct)2
+
1
2

@ut
@ht
h+
@2ut
@h2t
h2

(bht)2 + 1
2

@ut
@gct
gc +
@2ut
@gc2t
(gc)2

(bgct )2
+

@2ut
@ct@ht
ch
bctbht +  @2ut
@ct@gct
cgc
bctbgct +  @2ut@ht@gct hgc
bhtbgct
which can be used into (C:2): But this expression also includes endogenous
linear (deviation) terms, bht; bgct , bkt+1, bkt, bkgt+1 and bkgt :
Social planners (SP) problem
We now solve the associated social planners (SP) problem. The SP maxi-
mizes the representative households welfare, (C:2); subject to the production
function, (10a), the resource constraint, (10b), and the two capital evolution
equations, (10c) and (10g). To do so, the planner chooses the paths of all
allocations in the economy fct ; ht ; it ; kt+1; yt ; gct ; git ; kgt+1g1t=0. Note that
to distinguish between the DCEs and the SPs solution, a * superscript is
employed for the latter. Also note that, in contrast to the DCE in sub-
section 2.5 above: (i) there are no market failures (here in the form of non-
internalized wage rigidities and consumption habits); (ii) there are no policy
failures (here in the form of distorting taxes); (iii) public consumption and
public investment are also chosen optimally instead of being exogenous; (iv)
allocations are directly chosen so that the SP does not face any prices. It
is straightforward to show that the solution to this problem gives a system
of eight nonlinear stochastic di¤erence equations in fct ; ht ; it ; kt+1; yt ; gct ;
git ; k
g
t+1g1t=0 for a given path of technology, fatg1t=0. In the long-run of this
system, where all stationary variables do not change and there are no shocks,
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we have the following solution:
h =
21
21 + 2
(1  z ) c

y
(1 e 
z
)
(C:10a)
y =
"
a0
 
1e
z   e (1  p)
!1
(h)2

gi0
z + g   1
1 1 2#1=2
(C:10b)
c =
 
1  gc0   gi0  
1e (z + p   1)
z   e(1  p)
!
y (C:10c)
i =
 
1e (z + p   1)
z   e(1  p)
!
y (C:10d)
k =
 
1e
z   e(1  p)
!
y (C:10e)
kg =

gi0
z + g   1

y (C:10f)
rk =
1 (1   s0) y
k
(C:10g)
w =
2 (1   s0) y
h
(C:10h)
rb =
z   ee (1   y0) (C:10i)
gi0 
gi
y
=
(1  1   2) e (z + g   1)
z   e(1  g) (C:10j)
gc0 
gc
y
=
 
(1  1   2)(1  z )
1(1  e z )
!
c
y
(C:10k)
Implementing the long-run solution of the SP
To go from the real allocations implied by the long-run DCE solution (see
equations (A:1   A:10)) to those implied by the long-run SP solution (see
equations (C:10a  k)) requires that: (i) public investment and consumption
are set as in (C:10j) and (C:10k) respectively (ii) (1   y0) (1   s0) = 1 or
 s0 =
  y0
(1   y0)
(C:11a)
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and (iii) (1   c0)(1  e z ) = 1 or
 c0 =
e 
z
1  e 
z
(C:11b)
In other words, in the long-run, we use the output subsidy to undo the
policy distortion from the income tax, and the consumption tax rate to undo
the distortion from not internalizing habit persistence in the decentralized
competitive equilibrium. Using the above, the long-run lump-sum trans-
fer/tax changes from (A:10) to:
gtr0 = 0:6z

1  1e

  gc0   gi0 +
c
y
e 
z
(1  e 
z
)
(C:11c)
Quadratic approximate welfare
To eliminate the endogenous linear deviation terms in (C:9); we will make
use of the SPs long-run optimality conditions. Substituting the SPs optimal-
ity conditions for work e¤ort and public consumption written in the long-run
into (C:9) allows us to eliminate the bht and bgct terms. Note that since all
"coe¢ cients" are evaluated at the long-run of the SP, we use stars above
endogenous variables.
In (C:9); we also have linear deviation terms in private and public cap-
ital, i.e. zbkt+1   [1   p + 1yk ]bkt and zbkgt+1   [1   g + (1 1 2)ykg ]bkgt . It
is straightforward to show that the SPs long-run optimality conditions for
private and public capital written in the long-run imply respectively:
zbkt+1   [1  p + 1y
k
]bkt =   ze
bkt   ebkt+1 (C:12a)
and
zbkgt+1   [1  g + (1  1   2) ykg ]bkgt =   ze
bkgt   ebkgt+1 (C:12b)
in the within-period utility function, (C:9):
But then, in the intertemporal utility function, (C:2); where the e¤ective
discount rate is e, we have for private capital over time, t = 0; 1; ::::
  zeE0[
bk0   ebk1+ e bk1   ebk2+ :::] =   zebk0 (C:13a)
and similarly for public capital:
  zeE0[
bkg0   ebkg1+ e bkg1   bkg2+ :::] =   zebkg0 (C:13b)
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which are constants (see also Edge (2003, p. 16)).
Using all the above into (C:9), and in turn into (C:2); we can write the
latter without the endogenous linear deviation terms. Thus,46
E0
1X
t=0
tUht = E0
1X
t=0
(e)tut = (C:14)
= t:i:p+ E0[
1X
t=0
(e)tfa4(bkt+1   bkt)2 + a5(bkgt+1   bkgt )2
+a6 (bct)2 + a7(bit)2 + a8 (bgct )2 + a9(bgit)2 + a10 (byt)2
+a11(bht)2 + a12[ (bct + bht)2   (bct)2   (bht)22 ]
+a13[
(bct + bgct )2   (bct)2   (bgct )2
2
]
+a14[
(bht + bgct )2   (bht)2   (bgct )2
2
]g]
where we dene:
a1 (1 
e 
z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
kze ; a2 (1 e

z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
kgze ;
a3 (1 
e 
z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
y; a4 (1 
e 
z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
k 1
2
z (1  p) k
i ;
a5 (1 
e 
z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
kg 1
2
z (1  g) kg
gi ;
a6 [1+
e( 
z
)2][1(1 ) 1]1(1 )u
(1  
z
)2
1
2
; a7   (1 
e 
z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
1
2
i;
a8   (1 
e 
z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
1
2
gc+1
2
(1  1 2)2(1  )2u;
a9   (1 
e 
z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
1
2
gi; a10 (1 
e 
z
)1(1 )u
(1  
z
)c
1
2
y;
a11  2(1 )u
h[1 2(1 )h]
(1 h)2
1
2
; a12  12(1 )
2uh
(1  
z
)(1 h) ;
a131(1 1 2)(1 )
2u
(1  
z
)
; a14  2(1 1 2)(1 )
2uh
(1 h) :
t:i:p = u

1 e + a1bk0 + a2bkg0 + E0[ 1P
t=0
(e)ta3bat]
Note that (i) the rst four terms on the RHS of (C:14) are independent of
policy; (ii) the "coe¢ cients" ai for i = 1  14, as well as u; are evaluated at
the SPs long-run solution as given by (C:10a k); hence the star superscripts
above endogenous variables; (iii) we use the solution from Appendix B for
46Cross-terms are re-expressed as quadratic by adding and subtracting appropriately.
For instance, bctbht = [ (bct+bht)2 (bct)2 (bht)22 ]:
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the paths of bct; bht and bgct into (C:14); where all "coe¢ cients" are again eval-
uated at the SPs long-run solution; (iv) following the literature, we calculate
discounted lifetime utility over a 400 year horizon. All this gives a measure
of welfare under each regime, j = p; a:
Appendix D: 2nd-order approximate welfare
(distorted steady-state)
We now simply use (C:3) into (C:2); so that the expected value of dis-
counted lifetime utility is:
E0
1X
t=0
tUht = E0
1X
t=0
(e)tut ' (D:1)
' u
1  e + E0[
1X
t=0
(e)tfa1bct + a2bht + a3bgct
+a4(bct)2 + a5(bht)2 + a6 (bgct )2
+a7bctbht + a8bctbgct + a9bhtbgctg]
where we dene:
a11(1 )u(1 
e 
z
)
(1  
z
)
; a2 2(1 )uh(1 h) ;
a3 (1  1 2)(1  )u;
a41(1 )u(1 
e 
z
)
2(1  
z
)
+
[1(1 ) 1]1(1 )u[1+e( z )2]
2(1  
z
)2
;
a5  2(1 )uh2(1 h) + [2(1 ) 1]2(1 )uh
2
2(1 h)2 ; a6 (1 1 2)
2(1 )2u
2
;
a7 12(1 )
2uh
(1  
z
)(1 h) ; a8
1(1 1 2)(1 )2u
(1  
z
)
;
a9 2(1 1 2)(1 )
2uh
(1 h) ;
u  [c(1 

z
)]1(1 )(1 h)2(1 )(gc)(1 1 2)(1 )
1 
Note that (i) the "coe¢ cients" ai for i = 1 9, as well as u; are evaluated
at the long-run DCE solution derived in Appendix A; (ii) we use the solution
from Appendix B for the paths of bct; bht and bgct into (D:1); where all "coe¢ -
cients" are again evaluated at the long-run DCE solution; (iii) following the
literature, we calculate discounted lifetime utility over a 400 year horizon.
All this gives a measure of welfare under each regime, j = p; a:
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Figure 1: Impulse-responses
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Figure 2: Net welfare from fiscal stabilisation of 1% temporary productivity shock (social planner's steady state)
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Figure 3: Net welfare from fiscal stabilisation of 1% temporary productivity shock (distorted steady state)
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Figure 4: Net welfare from fiscal stabilisation of 1% temporary productivity shock (social planner's steady state)
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Figure 5: Net welfare from fiscal stabilisation of 1% temporary productivity shock (distorted steady state)
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